We study the e¤ects of a horizontal merger when …rms compete along two di¤erent dimensions: quality and price. In a general theoretical framework, we show that the price and quality responses by merging and non-merging …rms depend largely on two di¤erent characteristics: (i) the magnitude of variable quality costs, and (ii) the relative magnitudes of cross-quality and cross-price e¤ects on demand. The merging …rms will increase (reduce) both quality and price if the degree of competition is su¢ ciently stronger (weaker) on price than on quality. If variable quality costs are su¢ ciently small, non-merging …rms will respond to a merger by either reducing or increasing both price and quality. The welfare implications of a merger are not clear-cut, and a merger might improve welfare through endogenous …xed-cost savings.
Introduction
It is by now widely recognised that horizontal mergers may a¤ect consumer welfare not only through price changes but also through changes in key non-price characteristics such as product quality. In the recent empirical merger literature, several studies show, based on merger simulations, that quality e¤ects of mergers can be hugely important. For example, Fan (2013) develops a structural model of newspaper markets and show that ignoring adjustments to product characteristics as a result of a merger substantially a¤ects the simulated merger e¤ects. In the present paper we o¤er a contribution towards …lling this knowledge gap by presenting 1 Tenn et al. (2010) consider promotional e¤ort rather than quality, but these two non-price dimensions have of course many similarities. 2 what is, to our knowledge, the …rst comprehensive and general theoretical analysis of mergers when …rms compete on both a price and quality. We perform our analysis within a very general framework in which …rms produce di¤erentiated products and where demand responds negatively (positively) to own price (quality) and positively (negatively) to competing …rms' prices (qualities). We also allow for both …xed and variable costs associated with increasing the quality of a product.
Our analysis reveals that the price and quality e¤ects of a merger are far from clear-cut
and that a number of di¤erent equilibrium con…gurations are possible regarding the responses of merging and non-merging …rms. However, our analysis also shows that these e¤ects are to a large extent determined by two di¤erent factors: (i) the magnitude of variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction along the quality and price dimensions, and (ii) the relative magnitude of cross-quality and cross-price e¤ects on demand, which determines the relative intensity of competition along the quality and price dimensions.
Whether the merged …rm will increase or reduce qualities and prices depend on the relative strength of two counteracting incentives, which contributes to the general ambiguity of the merger e¤ects. These incentives will be carefully explained later on; here we will just summarise a few of our main …ndings. If …rms compete su¢ ciently strongly on quality relative to price, the merged …rm will increase both price and quality, and, vice versa, if competition is su¢ ciently much stronger on prices than on qualities, the merged …rm will reduce both price and quality.
However, for intermediate cases, it is also possible that the merged …rm will increase the price and reduce the quality.
The response from non-merging …rms depends on the nature of strategic interaction. If variable quality costs are su¢ ciently small, qualities are net strategic substitutes and prices are net strategic complements. 3 In this case, we show that the non-merging …rms' quality and price responses always go in the same direction. If the merged …rm's incentives to reduce quality are su¢ ciently strong, the non-merging …rms will respond by increasing both quality 3 The concept of net strategic substitutability/complementarity is explained in Section 2.
and price. On the other hand, if the merged …rm's have su¢ ciently strong incentives to increase prices, the non-merging …rms will respond by reducing both quality and price. The former case arises if competition is su¢ ciently strong along the quality dimension, whereas the latter case requires that competition is su¢ ciently strong along the price dimension.
Because of the general ambiguity of the merger e¤ects, we also present a parametric example based on a three-…rm Salop model, in order to illustrate some of the main mechanisms of the general model. Among other things, this parametric model reveals that when competition takes place also along a quality dimension, this opens up for the possibility that mergers might improve social welfare through endogenous …xed-cost savings. This and other potential welfare implications are discussed in a separate section of the paper.
Finally, we also extend the main analysis to allow for the possibility that, after the merger, the merger participants might withdraw one of their products (or, depending on the interpretation of the model, close down production at one of their plants). In this case, we show that a merger will lead to higher quality and price for all …rms in the industry if two conditions are met: (i) the merger increases the demand-responsiveness to price to a su¢ cient degree, and
(ii) variable quality costs are su¢ ciently small.
Besides extending the standard horizontal merger literature 4 by including a quality dimension, our paper is also related to the vast literature on competition and quality, dating back at least to Swan (1970) , who compared the incentives of a monopolist and a competitive …rm with respect to a particular quality dimension, namely product durability. Much of the subsequent literature consists of papers that apply a vertical di¤erentiation framework, often with …rms that o¤er a range of products with di¤erent qualities. 5 Models of price-quality competition in a horizontal di¤erentiation framework are fewer and include, i.e., Economides 4 See the seminal contributions by Salant et al. (1983) , Perry and Porter (1985) , and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) for horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly. Our study is more related to the seminal paper by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) who were the …rst to analyse horizontal mergers when …rms produce di¤eren-tiated products and compete in prices, showing that the merger e¤ects are very di¤erent than in a Cournot setting. 5 Some early key contributions to this strand of the literature include Thisse (1979, 1980 ) and Sutton (1982, 1983) for the case of single-product …rms, and Mussa and Rosen (1979) , Gal-Or (1983) and Champsaur and Rochet (1989) for the case of multi-product …rms.
(1993), Ma and Burgess (1993) , Gravelle (1999) and Brekke et al. (2010) . 6 Although the e¤ect of competition on quality provision is addressed in some of the above mentioned papers, there is no explicit merger analysis. In fact, theoretical studies that explicitly analyse the e¤ects of a horizontal merger on the price and quality o¤ered by merging and non-merging …rms are almost non-existent. 7 A rare recent exception is Pinto and Sibley (2014) , who add quality as a demand-shifter to a standard Marshallian-type demand system with horizontal product di¤erentiation and perform a merger analysis based on numerical simulations.
There are several di¤erences between their paper and ours. Importantly, while their analysis is based on a parametric model with explicit functional forms applied to the demand and cost structure, our analysis is based on a much more general framework. 8 Furthermore, besides applying a more general model, we also consider the case of product withdrawal following a merger (what we refer to as 'closure'), an aspect that is missing from their analysis.
Despite the obvious importance of the topic, the empirical literature on the e¤ects of horizontal mergers on quality is also relatively scarce. Besides the recent papers mentioned earlier, there are also a few studies addressing the quality e¤ects of mergers in hospital markets, where quality is clearly a key issue. 9 These studies tend to …nd large price e¤ects and weak (though mostly negative) e¤ects on quality (see Gaynor and Town, 2012).
10
Our paper is also somewhat related to the literature on horizontal mergers and product 6 There are also a few empirical papers studying the e¤ect of more competition on quality; for example Mazzeo (2003) , who …nds a positive relationship between competition and quality in the US airline industry; and Matsa (2011) who studies the e¤ect of competition on supermarkets' incentive to provide quality, and …nds that competition from Wal-Mart decreases inventory shortfalls by up to 24 percent. 7 Willig (2011) includes product quality in an analysis of unilateral competitive e¤ects of horizontal mergers ('upward pricing pressure'), but there is no equilibrium analysis with strategic interaction between merging and non-merging …rms. 8 This implies, among other things, that we are able to capture some e¤ects that are missing from their study. For example, while Pinto and Sibley assume constant marginal production costs, we allow for marginal production costs to increase with quality. Holding prices …xed, the latter assumption implies that qualities are strategic complements whereas the former assumption implies strategic independence. 9 There also exists a couple of theoretical studies on hospital mergers: Calem, Dor and Rizzo (1999) and Brekke (2004) . Among several di¤erences with the present study, an important limitation of these papers is that the analysis is cast in a duopoly setting, implying that a merger leads to a monopolisation of the hospital market. In contrast, an important feature of our merger analysis is how non-merging …rms respond to the merger. 10 See also Ho and Hamilton (2000) , Capps (2005) 
Model
Consider a market with n single-product …rms, each producing a di¤erentiated product. Demand for good i is given by D i (q 1 ; ::; q n ; p 1 ; ::; p n ; n), where q i and p i are the quality and price, respectively, of good i, with
We also assume that an increase in n reduces the demand for each good and makes demand more responsive to quality and price:
We assume that the demand system is symmetric and that demand for each good is separable in all qualities and prices.
The cost function of Firm i is assumed to be given by
where
> 0. Thus, we assume constant returns to scale for a given quality level, but there are both variable and …xed costs associated with an increase in the quality of the good produced. 11 For example, higher quality implies higher variable production costs if more expensive inputs are required to produce a higher-quality product.
Firms are assumed to be pro…t-maximisers with price and quality as their strategic choice variables. With the above demand and cost functions, the pro…t of Firm i is given by
We assume the …rms play a non-cooperative game where price and quality are chosen simultaneously.
Parametric example
Throughout the general analysis, in order to illustrate some of the main mechanisms of the model, we will present results from a parametric example based on spatial competition. Suppose that n = 3 with the …rms being equidistantly located on a circle with circumference equal to 1. A total mass of 1 consumers, each with unit demand, are uniformly distributed on the same circle. The net utility of a consumer located at z and buying the good from Firm i, located at x i , is given by
where v, b and t are all strictly positive. The corresponding demand for good o¤ered by Firm i is
The cost function is parameterised by setting c (q i ) = cq i and
and F are positive parameters. We also impose the restriction b > c in order to ensure interior solutions with strictly positive equilibrium quality levels in the pre-and post-merger games. 12 
Strategic relationship between qualities and prices
Before analysing the e¤ects of a merger on prices and qualities, it is highly instructive to investigate the strategic relationship between the …rms' choice variables, which to a large extent determines the nature of the di¤erent mechanisms at play. Consider, for simplicity, the case of n = 2, in which the de…nition of strategic substitutability/complementarity is straightforward. The symmetric Nash equilibrium is then implicitly characterised by the following pair of …rst-order conditions:
From this system of equations we can derive two di¤erent sets of best-response functions: (i) q i (p i ; q j ; p j ) and p i (q i ; q j ; p j ), which are the best-quality-response and best-priceresponse functions, respectively, when keeping all other variables constant; and (ii) q i (q j ; p j ) and p i (q j ; p j ), which are the best-quality-response and best-price-response functions when the …rm optimally adjust its own price and quality, respectively. The …rst set of best-response functions determine whether qualities (prices) are gross strategic substitutes or complements, whereas the second set of best-response functions determine net strategic substitutability or complementarity.
Consider …rst the strategic relationship between qualities for given price levels, and between 12 See Appendix B for an explicit derivation of the pre-and post-merger equilibrium outcomes for the parametric example.
prices for given quality levels. Regarding qualities, the strategic relationship is given by
Thus, as long as there is a positive relationship between quality and marginal production costs, qualities are gross strategic complements. The intuition is the following. If one …rm increases its quality, the competing …rm loses demand, which in turn reduces its marginal cost of quality provision. This …rm will therefore respond by increasing its quality. Notice that this strategic relationship requires the presence of variable quality costs.
Regarding prices, the strategic relationship is given by
Thus, prices are gross strategic complements, which is a standard result from the oligopoly literature. All else equal, a unilateral price increase by one …rm leads to higher demand for the competing …rm, which optimally responds by increasing its price.
However, if a …rm changes its price (quality), it will also have an incentive to optimally adjust its quality (price). The strategic relationship between price and quality within a …rm is given by
Thus, price and quality are strategic complements within …rms. Abstracting from any strategic responses by the competing …rm, a price increase has two e¤ects on incentives for quality provision. It increases the …rm's pro…t margin and also reduces the marginal cost of quality provision through lower demand. Both e¤ects contribute to a higher optimal level of quality. Vice versa, a higher quality level leads to higher demand and also increases marginal production costs, and both e¤ects contribute to a higher optimal price.
By internalising the above price-quality relationship, we can derive the conditions for qualities (prices) to be net strategic substitutes or complements. By di¤erentiating (5)- (6) with respect to q i , p i and q j and applying Cramer's Rule, we have
Thus, whether qualities are net strategic substitutes or complements depends on the relative strength of two opposing forces. On the one hand, qualities are gross strategic complements (second term in (10)). On the other hand, if competing …rm j increases quality, then …rm i will have lower demand and its pro…ts are therefore maximised, all else equal, at a lower price.
Since price and quality are within-…rm strategic complements, the quality level will also be adjusted downwards (…rst term in (10)). If latter e¤ect dominates the former, qualities are net strategic substitutes.
Similarly, the net strategic relationship between prices are given by
Again, the sign of this expression is determined by the relative strength of two counteracting forces. On the one hand, prices are gross strategic complements (…rst term in (11)). On the other hand, a price increase by competing …rm j leads to higher demand for …rm i. As a result, …rm i's marginal costs of quality provision will increase and it will optimally respond by reducing its quality. Since price and quality are within-…rm strategic complements, the price level will also be adjusted downwards (second term in (11)). If the former e¤ect dominates the latter, prices are net strategic complements.
In our parametric example, it is easily shown that qualities are always net strategic substitutes, whereas prices are net strategic complements. More generally, the above analysis can be summarised as follows:
Lemma 1 If variable quality costs are su¢ ciently small, qualities are net strategic substitutes whereas prices are net strategic complements.
Quality and price e¤ects of a merger
Consider a merger between two of the n …rms in the industry. In a di¤erentiated products model, given that the merger does not a¤ect the number of goods produced, the post-merger game is an asymmetric game between one multi-product …rm (the merged …rm) and n 2 single-product …rms. 13 Thus, a merger is a discrete change of market structure that, in a general (non-parameterised) model, makes it hard to use standard comparative statics tools to assess the e¤ects of the merger. One way to overcome this problem is to consider a 'marginal merger'. Suppose that the objective functions of the merger candidates (denoted i and j) are i := i + j and j := j + i , respectively, where 2 (0; 1). The pre-and post-merger games appear then as the special cases of = 0 and = 1, respectively. Given the assumption that the equilibrium outcomes (prices and qualities) are monotonic in , we can qualitatively assess the e¤ects of a merger on these variables by considering a marginal increase in . 14;15 Let N = f1; ::; ng be the set of pre-merger …rms/products in the industry, let M = fi; jg be the set of merger participants, and let O = N nM be the set of outside (non-merging) …rms.
For the merging Firm i, which merges with Firm j, the …rst-order conditions for optimal quality and price are given by
Because of symmetry, p j = p i and q j = q i in equilibrium, which implies that (12)- (13) can be re-written as
For the non-merging Firm k, the …rst-order conditions are
The Nash equilibrium is thus implicitly given by a system of four equations, (14)- (17), where all demand functions and their …rst-order derivatives are evaluated at the quality-price vector (q i ; q i ; q k ; :::; q k ; p i ; p i ; p k ; :::p k ). By di¤erentiating the system (14)- (17) with respect to (q i ; p i ; q k ; p k ) and , and applying Cramer's Rule, we can derive the equilibrium e¤ects of the merger on the qualities and prices of all …rms in the industry.
The quality of the merging …rms
Qualitatively, the e¤ect of a merger on the merging …rms'quality provision is given by 16 sign(
where > 0 is a function of the equilibrium variables (see Appendix A for an explicit de…ni-tion) 17 , and
We can classify the various sub-e¤ects into two categories: (i) …rst-order e¤ects through the merged …rm's quality and price setting, and (ii) second-order (feedback) e¤ects through the strategic responses of non-merging …rms. The two sets of e¤ects are grouped together 16 See Appendix A for full details of the derivations of all expressions in this section. 17 The positive sign of follows from the assumption of a negative de…nite Jacobian matrix.
in the two terms on the right-hand side of (18) , where the …rst (second) term represents the …rst-order (second-order) e¤ects.
There are two di¤erent …rst-order e¤ects, which have opposite sign. First, the merger allows the merger participants to internalise a negative quality competition externality, which implies a lower quality level. This e¤ect is captured by the …rst term in the square brackets of (18) .
Second, the merger also allows the merged …rm to internalise a negative price competition externality, which implies a higher price. Since price and quality are within-…rm strategic complements, this contributes to a higher quality level as a result of the merger. This e¤ect is captured by the second term in the square brackets.
Thus, the sum of the above described …rst-order e¤ects is a priori indeterminate and depends on how strong competition is on quality versus price; more speci…cally, the overall e¤ect depends on the cross-quality versus cross-price e¤ects on demand. Suppose that the cross-quality e¤ects on demand are large relative to the cross-price e¤ects (i.e., j@D j =@q i j is large relative to @D j =@p i ), which implies that …rms compete harder on quality than on price. In this case, the …rst of the two above described e¤ects is large relative to the second, implying a drop in quality provision by the merger participants. Vice versa, if the degree of price competition is su¢ ciently strong relative to the degree of quality competition, a merger might lead to higher quality by the merging …rms.
The …rst-order e¤ects of a merger are complemented by feedback e¤ects through the nonmerged …rms'price and quality responses. These e¤ects are given by the second term in (18), with an a priori indeterminate sign. Whether the feedback e¤ects counteract or reinforce the …rst-order e¤ects depends on the relative strength of quality and price competition, and on the strategic nature of competition along these two dimensions. By comparing (19) - (20) with (10)- (11), we see that the signs of p and q are exactly determined by whether prices and qualities, respectively, are net strategic substitutes or complements. More speci…cally, p > (<) 0 if prices are net strategic substitutes (complements), whereas q > (<) 0 if qualities are net strategic substitutes (complements), as these concepts are de…ned in Section 2.2.
Consider the case of small variable quality costs, implying that (@D j =@q i )+(@c=@q i ) (@D j =@p i ) < 0 and that prices are net strategic complements whereas qualities are net strategic substitutes (i.e., p < 0 and q > 0). In this case, the sign of the feedback e¤ects is determined by the relative magnitude of the terms j(@D i =@p k ) p j and j(@D i =@q k ) q j. If the degree of quality competition is su¢ ciently strong relative to the degree of price competition, the second term dominates and the feedback e¤ects are negative. On the other hand, if the …rms compete su¢ ciently much harder on price than on quality, the …rst term dominates and the feedback e¤ects are positive. In both cases, though, the feedback e¤ects tend to reinforce the …rst-order e¤ects, since the …rst-order quality e¤ects of a merger is negative (positive) when competition is su¢ ciently much stronger along the quality (price) dimension. More generally, though, whether the feedback e¤ects reinforce or counteract the …rst-order e¤ects, we would expect that the feedback e¤ects do not dominate, implying that the sign of the merger e¤ect on quality is determined by the previously described …rst-order e¤ects.
The ambiguity of the general model is resolved in our parametric example. In the linear Salop model, the e¤ect of a merger on the merged …rm's quality provision is found always to be negative. More generally, we can summarise the above analysis as follows:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the e¤ect of a merger on the merged …rm's quality provision is determined by the sign of the …rst-order e¤ects. A merger will then lead to lower (higher) quality by the merged …rm if the cross-quality e¤ect on demand is su¢ ciently large (small) relative to the cross-price e¤ect.
The price of the merging …rms
The e¤ect of the merger on the prices charged by the merging …rms is given, in qualitative terms, by
As for the quality e¤ect of the merger, the price e¤ect is a sum of two sets of sub-e¤ects:
…rst-order e¤ects (…rst term) and feedback e¤ects (second term). Also equivalently to the quality e¤ect, the …rst-order price e¤ects consist of two counteracting mechanisms. On the one hand, the internalisation of the price competition externality leads to higher prices. This is captured by the …rst term in the square brackets of (21) . On the other hand, the internalisation of the quality competition externality leads to lower quality and therefore to lower prices, because of within-…rm strategic complementarity between price and quality. This e¤ect is captured by the second term in the square brackets. Once more, the relative magnitude of these e¤ects depend on the relative strength of price competition versus quality competition.
If the cross-price e¤ects on demand are su¢ ciently large relative to the cross-quality e¤ects, implying that the …rms compete more strongly on price than on quality, the former e¤ect dominates and a merger leads (by the …rst-order e¤ects) to higher prices. However, if the degree of quality competition is su¢ ciently strong relative to the degree of price competition, the latter e¤ect will dominate and a merger might, perhaps paradoxically, lead to lower prices.
The non-merging …rms'price and quality responses create feedback e¤ects on the merged …rm's optimal price setting. These feedback e¤ects are given by the second term in (21), with a generally indeterminate sign. However, notice by comparison of the second terms in (18) and (21) that the direction of these feedback e¤ects are equivalent for price and quality. Thus, as for the case of quality, the feedback e¤ects tend to reinforce the …rst-order price e¤ects when the relationship between quality and marginal production cost is low, and when the degree of competition is su¢ ciently much stronger in either the price or the quality dimension.
The above analysis illustrates how introducing a quality dimension to …rms'strategic interaction can dramatically alter the price e¤ects of a merger. In the absence of quality competition, a merger without cost synergies would always lead to higher prices. However, when …rms also compete on quality, the price e¤ect of a merger becomes generally indeterminate, and depends on the relative strength of price and quality competition, as explained above.
This indeterminacy is also captured in our parametric example, where it can be shown (see Appendix B) that the price set by the merging …rms increases (decreases) if the demand responsiveness to quality is su¢ ciently low (high). More generally, the price e¤ects of a merger can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the e¤ect of a merger on the merged …rm's price decisions is determined by the sign of the …rst-order e¤ects. A merger will then lead to higher (lower)
prices by the merged …rm if the cross-price e¤ect on demand is su¢ ciently large (small) relative to the cross-quality e¤ect.
Quality and price responses by non-merging …rms
The quality and price responses of the non-merging …rms are given by, respectively,
and
Notice here that p > (<) 0 and q > (<) 0 if the …rst-order e¤ects of the merger on the merged …rm's price and quality are positive (negative).
It follows from (22)- (23) that the quality and price responses of non-merging …rms depend on two di¤erent factors: (i) the size of variable quality costs, which determines whether qualities and prices are net strategic substitutes or complements (i.e., the signs of q and p ), and (ii) the relative magnitude of cross-quality and cross-price e¤ects on demand, which determines the direction of the …rst-order e¤ects on the merged …rm's quality and price (i.e., the signs of q and p ).
Notice that whether the non-merging …rms' quality and price responses go in the same direction or not depends only on the net strategic substitutability/complementarity of qualities and prices. If qualities are net strategic substitutes ( q > 0) and prices are net strategic complements ( p < 0), or vice versa ( q < 0 and p > 0), then quality and price responses from the non-merging …rms always go in the same direction. Otherwise, if qualities and prices are both net strategic substitutes or net strategic complements, quality and price responses go in opposite directions.
Consider the case of q > 0 and p < 0, which requires that variable quality costs are su¢ ciently small (see Lemma 1) . In this case, the non-merging …rms'will either increase or reduce both quality and price, depending on the sign of the expression in square brackets in (22) and (23), which in turn depends on the quality and price adjustments of the merging …rms. If the merged …rm reduces its quality ( q < 0) and increases its price ( p > 0), the nonmerging …rms have an unambiguous incentive to increases both their qualities (since qualities are net strategic substitutes) and their prices (since prices are net strategic complements).
However, if the merged …rm reduces both quality and price, the second term in the square brackets is negative and the e¤ect on the non-merging …rms' price and quality responses is ambiguous. The same ambiguity appears in the case where the merged …rm increases both quality and price. This ambiguity is resolved, though, if the degree of competition is su¢ ciently much stronger along one or the other of the two dimensions (quality and price).
Suppose that cross-quality e¤ects on demand are much stronger than cross-price e¤ects, such that j(@D k =@q i ) q j > j(@D k =@p i ) p j and q < 0. In this case, where the …rms compete harder on quality than on price, the merged …rm will reduce its quality (and price) and the non-merging …rms respond by increasing their qualities and prices. On the other hand, suppose that cross-price e¤ects on demand are much stronger than cross-quality e¤ects, such that j(@D k =@q i ) q j < j(@D k =@p i ) p j and p > 0. In this case, where …rms compete harder on price than on quality, the merged …rm will increase its price (and quality) but the non-merging …rms still respond by increasing their qualities and prices.
Our analysis throughout this section suggests that there is a large number of possibilities regarding the equilibrium quality and price responses by merging and non-merging …rms. Our parametric example captures two of these possibilities: (i) If competition along the quality dimension is su¢ ciently strong, the merged …rm reduces both quality and price, whereas the non-merged …rm increases both quality and price; (ii) if demand is less quality-responsive, the merged …rm reduces quality but increases the price, whereas the non-merged …rm still increases both quality and price. The former case is characterised by p < 0 and latter by 
Welfare
What are the potential welfare e¤ects of a merger when …rms compete on both quality and price? In equilibrium, social welfare, de…ned as the sum of consumers'and producers'surplus, is given by
where the …rst (second) term refers to the total surplus being created by the production of the merger participants (outside …rms), and where p A merger will generally change all the prices and qualities, and, as we know from the analysis of the previous section, the direction of price and quality changes for merging and non-merging …rms are generally ambiguous. Because of these ambiguities, a general characterisation of the welfare e¤ects of a merger is hard to produce. However, the main purpose of this welfare section is to point out how and why competition along two di¤erent dimensions (price and quality) might alter the welfare implications of a merger in a fundamental way, compared with the standard case of pure price competition, and give rise to the possibility of welfare-improving mergers.
In the absence of quality competition, a merger without any cost synergies will generally reduce welfare because it leads to higher prices in the industry. However, this conclusion is no longer so clear-cut when …rms also compete on quality, for several reasons. As the analysis in the previous section has shown, a merger might well lead to lower prices or higher qualities, at least for some …rms, which makes the welfare assessment more ambiguous. For example, if qualities are net strategic substitutes and prices are net strategic complements, which will be the case if variable quality costs are su¢ ciently small, one implication of the …rst part of Proposition 3 is that a merger will always lead to either higher quality or lower prices by non-merging …rms.
Furthermore, the presence of …xed quality costs opens up for the possibility that mergers might improve welfare by generating endogenous …xed-cost synergies. Suppose that qualities are net strategic substitutes. A merger will then typically make the quality provision more asymmetric between merging and non-merging …rms, which potentially implies a reduction in total …xed costs. To see why more asymmetric quality provision can lead to endogenous …xed-cost savings, consider the following simple example. Suppose that n = 2. Suppose also that q i < q j and p i = p j , implying D i < D j . Consider now a marginal change in q i . The necessary change in q j that keeps average quality (denoted by q) unchanged is given by
The corresponding change in total …xed costs is
Since K is strictly convex, @K=@q i < @K=@q j if q i < q j . Thus, a necessary condition for more asymmetric quality provision (i.e., dq i < 0 such that dq = 0) to reduce total …xed quality costs is @q=@q j > @q=@q i , which holds if equilibrium market shares are convex, linear or 'not too concave' in qualities. In this case, a merger that makes quality provision more asymmetric might lead to endogenous …xed-cost savings which can potentially be large enough to make the merger welfare improving.
An example of such a welfare improving merger appears in the linear Salop model for a parameter set which is characterised by a relatively low degree of …xed-cost convexity, a relatively high degree of demand-responsiveness to quality, and a relatively low degree of product di¤erentiation. 19 
Extension: Mergers with closure
In this section we extend the analysis by considering the case where the merged …rm decides to reduce its product line by o¤ering only one product after the merger, or, if the model is 19 See Appendix B for further details.
given a spatial interpretation, the merged …rm closes down one of its two plants and allocates all production to the remaining plant. Such closure would be pro…table if there are su¢ ciently large product-speci…c (or plant-speci…c) …xed costs. Thus, the analysis in this extension applies to cases where the realisation of …xed-cost savings is an important motivation for the merger.
When the merged …rm is a single-product (or single-plant) …rm, the pre-and post-merger equilibria are symmetric and a merger is equivalent to reducing the number of …rms/products, which implies that the quality and price e¤ects of a merger is the same for merging and non-merging …rms. The symmetric (pre-merger) equilibrium is characterised by
where all demand functions and their …rst-order derivatives are evaluated at the quality-price vector (q i ; :::; q i ; p i ; :::; p i ).
By di¤erentiating (29)-(30) with respect to p i , q i and n, and applying Cramer's Rule, the e¤ect of a merger on equilibrium quality is given by 20 sign @q i @n = sign 2 6 6 6 6 4
The quality e¤ect of a merger is given by the sum of three sub-e¤ects, represented by the three terms on the right-hand side of (31). First, a merger reduces the demand responsiveness to price, which leads to a higher price and therefore higher quality. Second, a merger reduces 20 See Appendix A for the full derivation of all results in this section.
the demand responsiveness to quality, which leads directly to a lower quality provision. 21 The third e¤ect is a priori ambiguous. A merger increases demand (per …rm), which increases the marginal cost of quality and therefore leads to lower quality. On the other hand, the demand increase also leads to a higher price and therefore higher quality (since price and quality are within-…rm strategic complements). The third e¤ect is positive if variable quality costs are su¢ ciently small, or if demand responds su¢ ciently stronger to quality than to price.
Similarly, the e¤ect of a merger on equilibrium price is given by
Once more, the total e¤ect is a sum of three sub-e¤ects, given by the three terms in (32).
First, a merger reduces the demand responsiveness to price, which leads directly to a higher price. 22 Second, a merger also reduces the demand responsiveness to quality, which leads to lower quality and therefore to a lower price. The third term has an ambiguous sign. A merger increases demand (per …rm), which makes demand less price-elastic and leads to a higher price. However, higher demand also leads to lower quality because of increased marginal cost of quality, which in turn leads to a lower price. The third term is positive if variable quality costs are su¢ ciently small.
In our parametric example, the third term in both (31) and (32) are positive. Furthermore, in each expression the two positive terms dominate the one negative term, implying that a 21 Notice that a negative de…nite Jacobian matrix requires
22 Notice that a negative de…nite Jacobian matrix requires
merger increases both the quality and the price. 23 In the more general model, the above analysis can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 4 A merger with closure leads to higher quality and price for all …rms if (i) the merger leads to a su¢ ciently large reduction in the demand responsiveness to price, and if (ii) variable quality costs are su¢ ciently small.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analysed the e¤ects of horizontal mergers when …rms compete along two di¤erent dimensions: price and quality. We have shown that the e¤ects of a merger are quite involved because of the strategic relationship between quality and price, and we report some perhaps surprising results. First, whether a merger will induce the merger participants to increase or reduce prices and qualities are far from clear-cut. If …rms compete su¢ ciently strongly on quality, a merger might lead to lower prices, and if …rms compete su¢ ciently strongly on price, a merger might lead to higher quality. The non-merging …rms' price and quality responses are also far from obvious. We have shown that, if variable quality costs are su¢ ciently small, a merger will induce non-merging …rms either to increase both price and quality, or to reduce both price and quality, depending on the relative strength of price and quality competition.
The general pattern of our results suggest that welfare implications of mergers are much less clear-cut when …rms compete along two di¤erent dimensions, compared with the standard case of price competition. As we have discussed in Section 4, there are two reasons for this. First, a merger will most likely result in higher quality or lower price for some …rms in the industry, which makes the welfare assessment of a merger a priori more ambiguous. Second, the presence of …xed quality costs implies that a merger might improve welfare through endogenous …xed-cost savings, something that we are able to explicitly con…rm in a parametric example.
Although we have conducted our analysis within a very general framework, we have nevertheless been forced to make a couple of simpli…cations in order to make the analysis feasible.
We have assumed that demand is separable in all qualities and prices, and we have assumed constant returns to scale for given quality levels. Although these simpli…cations somewhat reduce the generality of the analysis, we still believe that we have been able to capture the most important mechanisms that determine the strategic choices in markets where …rms compete on both price and quality.
Appendix A
In this appendix we present the details of the comparative statics results; …rst from the main model presented in Sections 2-3 and then from the model extension presented in Section 5.
A.1. Comparative statics in the main model
The Nash equilibrium is implicitly given by a system of four equations, given by (14)- (17) in Section 3, which are here rede…ned as
where the demand functions are given by 
where we have exploited the fact that, by symmetry,
A.1.1. The e¤ect of a merger on the merged …rm' s quality
Assuming that the Jacobian matrix is negative de…nite, the sign of @q i =@ is given by the sign of
This determinant can be written as
or, when substituting from (A6),
Notice that > 0 by the assumption of a negative de…nite Jacobian matrix. Since (p i c(q i )) > 0 in equilibrium, we can factor this out of (A9) and arrive at:
A.1.2. The e¤ect of a merger on the merged …rm' s price
The sign of @p i =@ is given by the sign of
After factoring out (p i c(q i )) > 0 from (A17) we arrive at
A.1.3. The e¤ect of a merger on the non-merging …rms'qualities
The sign of @q k =@ is given by the sign of
Notice, however, that
which eliminates the third term in (A21). The remaining two terms can, after substituting from (A6), be written as
Factoring out 2 (p i c(q i )) > 0 from (A22), we get
A.1.4. The e¤ect of a merger on the non-merging …rms'prices
The sign of @p k =@ is given by the sign of
This determinant can be written as The symmetric Nash equilibrium is implicitly given by (29)- (30), which can be rede…ned as
where the demand functions are given by D i (p i ; :::; p i ; q i ; :::; q i ; n). By di¤erentiating (A30)-(A31) with respect to q i , p i and n, we can write the system on matrix form as The e¤ects of the merger on average quality and price are given by 
A comparison of (B1) and (B16) yields
